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Abstract 
A matching model will explain both unemployment and economic growth by considering the 
underground sector. Three problems can thus be simultaneously accounted for: (i) the 
persistence of underground economy, (ii) the ambiguous relationships between underground 
employment and unemployment, and (iii) between growth and unemployment. Key 
assumptions are that entrepreneurial ability is heterogeneous, skill accumulation determines 
productivity growth, job-seekers choose whether to invest in education. The conclusions are 
that the least able entrepreneurs set up underground firms, employ unskilled labour, and do 
not contribute to growth. Underground employment alleviates unemployment only if the 
monitoring rate is sufficiently low. 
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Non-technical summary 
 
This theoretical paper contributes to explaining three stylised facts at the same time, viz.: 
(i) the underground economy appears to be persistent and widespread in most countries. 
This fact has also been called the ‘shadow puzzle’; 
(ii) underground employment and unemployment exhibit an ambiguous relationship 
across countries; 
(iii) economic growth and unemployment also exhibit an ambiguous relationship across 
countries and over time.  
As far as we are aware, no study has attempted to deal with these three issues at the same 
time. In particular, no study has attempted to link the human capital-economic growth nexus to 
unemployment through the economy’s composition in the regular and underground sectors.  
The paper develops a search and matching model of equilibrium unemployment à la 
Mortensen and Pissarides in two sectors where entrepreneurial ability and human capital play a 
key role. The model is based on the following assumptions, which are supported by a variety of 
empirical studies: 
- labour productivity is lower in the underground sector with respect to the regular sector; 
- individuals are heterogeneous in their entrepreneurial abilities; 
- irregular firms have lower entry costs and taxes than regular firms, but bear the risk of being 
discovered as unregistered and destroyed, according to the monitoring rate implemented; 
- irregular firms employ unskilled labour, while regular firms employ skilled labour; 
- education is costly, and individuals can choose whether or not to invest in education and 
become skilled; 
- the education level determines productivity growth by producing externalities also in favour 
of the underground sector. 
These assumptions make it possible to find an interior equilibrium where both sectors 
survive, thus providing an original explanation for the ‘shadow puzzle’. In this equilibrium, 
individuals with an unprofitable level of entrepreneurial ability seek jobs as employees; 
individuals with just sufficient ability open vacancies in the underground sector, and the ablest 
individuals open vacancies in the regular sector. Expected profits and wages are higher in the 
regular sector. On this basis, individuals who search for jobs as employees choose whether or not 
to invest in education and to become skilled before entering the labour market. Therefore, the 
education level is higher in the regular sector, and the size of this sector can thus contribute to 
explain economic growth. 
If education influences labour productivity with increasing returns when it is at low levels, 
and with decreasing returns at high levels, two relevant equilibria may emerge. The economy 
represented by the more efficient equilibrium displays a smaller underground sector, higher levels 
of entrepreneurial ability used, extra-profits, relative wages, skill, education, and greater 
productivity growth. 
The model contributes to explaining the other two stylised facts by adopting a novel 
perspective in which the monitoring rate plays a key role. In fact, the model predicts that the 
relationship between the underground employment and unemployment (issue (ii)) is negative 
(positive), and the relationships between productivity growth and unemployment (issue (iii)) is 
positive (negative) if the monitoring rate is sufficiently low (high). These results may account for 
the difference between Latin American and EU transition countries vs. EU non-transition 
countries. 
Policies for entrepreneurship, education, and monitoring would help both employment and 
economic growth. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The study of the underground economy that adopts matching-type models is not new 
in the economic literature. Two aims are usually pursued: solving the ‘shadow puzzle’, i.e. the 
persistence of the underground economy in a variety of contexts and times (Boeri and 
Garibaldi, 2002, 2006); highlighting the ambiguous relationship between underground 
employment and unemployment (Bouev, 2002, 2005; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Kolm 
and Larsen, 2003, 2010; Fugazza and Jacques, 2004; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2009; 
Albrecht et al., 2009). 
 The study of endogenous economic growth that also adopts matching-type models was 
initiated by Pissarides’ (1990) book, and by Aghion and Howitt (1994), so that the issue of the 
relationship between growth and unemployment has been both raised and addressed with new 
analytical tools (Laing et al., 1995; Aghion and Howitt, 1998; Mortensen and Pissarides, 
1998; Pissarides, 2000; Mortensen, 2005). In fact, different authors obtain different results 
concerning the sign of the correlation between growth and unemployment, both across 
countries and across long periods of time in the same country (Aghion and Howitt, 1994; 
Bean and Pissarides, 1993; Caballero, 1993; Hoon and Phelps, 1997; Muscatelli and Tirelli, 
2001). This ambiguity has been explained on the basis of theoretical assumptions about 
technological progress and the interest rate (see the next section). 
 However, as far as we are aware, no study has attempted to deal with the three issues 
at the same time, i.e. (i) the persistence of underground economy, also called the ‘shadow 
puzzle’, (ii) the ambiguous relationship between the underground employment and 
unemployment, (iii) the ambiguous relationship between growth and unemployment. This 
paper makes such an attempt by developing a new matching model with the following key 
assumptions. First, individuals are heterogeneous in their entrepreneurial ability, and they can 
use it to run either a regular firm or an underground firm, which has smaller entry costs and 
taxes, but also lower productivity. These assumptions, which are empirically well-founded 
(La Porta and Shleifer 2008), make it possible to find an interior equilibrium where both 
sectors survive, thereby adopting Lucas’s (1978) approach of heterogeneous talent allocation, 
which has been subsequently developed by Baumol (1990), Rauch (1991), and van Praag and 
Cramer (2001). In this equilibrium, individuals with an unprofitable level of entrepreneurial 
ability seek jobs as employees; individuals with just sufficient ability open vacancies in the 
underground sector, and the ablest individuals open vacancies in the regular sector. This 
solution of the ‘shadow puzzle’ is new and general (Lisi and Pugno, 2010).  
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Another key assumption of our model states that regular firms employ skilled labour, 
while underground firms employ unskilled labour. This assumption is supported by a variety 
of evidence (Agénor and Aizenman, 1999; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Bosch and 
Esteban-Pretel, 2009; Cimoli, Primi and Pugno, 2006; Kolm and Larsen, 2010). In the 
individual’s choice setting, this assumption leads to the further analytical postulate that 
individuals who search for jobs as employees have already chosen whether or not to invest in 
education and to become skilled before entering the labour market. Empirical support is 
provided by the fact that employment in the underground sector and the education level 
within countries appear to be negatively correlated (Albrecht et. al., 2009; Cappariello and 
Zizza, 2009). 
A further key assumption of our model receives rather usual support in the literature 
about the role of human capital in endogenous growth (Romer, 1986, 1988, 1989; Lucas, 
1988; Rebelo, 1991; Stokey, 1991), as recently surveyed by Savvides and Stengos (2009). 
Specifically, the assumption states that the education level determines productivity growth 
(Laing et al., 1995) by producing externalities also in favour of the underground sector. Since 
the education level is higher in the regular sector, the size of this sector contributes to 
explaining economic growth. Therefore, the ultimate engine of economic growth is “good 
matching” between the ablest entrepreneurs and the most educated workers. 
This conclusion is interesting for the debate on the role of the underground economy 
in economic development, and on the policy implications (de Soto, 1989; Johnson et al., 
2000; Friedman et al., 2000; Farrell, 2004; Carillo and Pugno, 2004; Banerjee and Duflo, 
2005; Cimoli, Primi and Pugno, 2006). In particular, our theoretical conclusion accounts for 
La Porta and Shleifer’s (2008) empirical finding that growth needs those firms which are most 
productive, and which hence cannot be informal. 
On the basis of these assumptions, our model aids understanding of not only the 
shadow puzzle (issue (i)), but also the ambiguous relationships between underground 
employment and unemployment (issue (ii)), and between growth and unemployment (issues 
(iii)). Issue (ii) has arisen in the literature because of an ambiguity in the results. According to 
Bouev’s (2002, 2005) matching model, scaling down the underground sector may lead to a 
decrease in unemployment, whereas, according to Boeri and Garibaldi’s (2002, 2006) 
matching model, attempts to reduce shadow employment will result in higher open 
unemployment. Issue (iii) has been effectively synthesised by Mortensen (2005), who shows 
that the correlation between average growth and average unemployment over the past ten 
years across 29 European countries is essentially zero.  
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By considering that the economy includes underground firms, which benefit from 
evading taxes and from lower wages, but are burdened by backward techniques and by the 
risk of being discovered as unregistered and destroyed according to a monitoring rate, our 
model yields the following conclusion about issue (ii). The proportion of underground 
employment is positively related with the unemployment rate if the monitoring rate is 
sufficiently high, whereas, conversely, the proportion of underground employment is 
negatively related with the unemployment rate if the monitoring rate is sufficiently low. Since 
the proportion of underground employment negatively contributes to economic growth, the 
conclusion about issue (iii) follows. Economic growth is negatively related with 
unemployment if the monitoring rate is sufficiently high, whereas economic growth is 
positively related with unemployment if the monitoring rate is sufficiently low. 
 The empirical plausibility of these conclusions can be shown by scatter diagrams on 
the growth/unemployment axes vis-à-vis Mortensen’s (2005) synthesis, which eventually 
brings us to issue (iii). The groups of countries with the highest monitoring rate (captured by 
the ‘rule of law’ index), such as the EU non-transition countries, exhibit a negative correlation 
(Fig. 1). The groups of countries with the lowest monitoring rate, such as the EU transition 
countries and the Latin American countries, exhibit a positive, though less close, correlation 
(see Figs 1-2).1 
==========  Figs. 1-2 about here (now at the end with related data)  ========= 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 1 briefly reviews the literature on 
growth and unemployment in the matching framework; section 2 presents the model with 
underground sector and finds the steady-state solutions; section 3 extends the model to 
endogenous investment in education and finds the steady-growth solutions; while section 4 
concludes with some remarks on policy implications. The appendices set out the relevant 
proofs and mathematical details. 
 
 
1. A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before the recent papers of search and matching theory, economic growth was usually 
analysed in a framework without unemployment. This was an important shortcoming in the 
                                                 
1
 The correlation coefficient between the growth rate and the unemployment rate for the group of EU non-
transition countries is –0.30 if they report a high ‘rule of law’ (above 88), and –0.17 for the same group 
irrespective of the ‘rule of law’. The correlation coefficient for the group of EU transition countries is –0.13 if 
the outlier Poland is included but 0.30 if it is excluded. The correlation coefficient for the group of Latin 
American countries is 0.43 if Chile, which records a high index of ‘rule of law’ (88), is excluded, and 0.39 if 
Chile is included. 
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neoclassical literature, as acknowledged by Solow himself (1988), but it was justified by the 
mere cyclical nature of unemployment. The influential papers of Aghion and Howitt (1994, 
1998), Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) and Pissarides (2000), enable us to study growth and 
unemployment in the same framework, linking the neoclassical growth theory (Solow, 1956) 
with the theory of the natural rate of unemployment (Friedman, 1968; Phelps, 1968). It has 
thus been recognised that unemployment has also a structural nature which persists over the 
business cycle. 
The analysis of both growth and unemployment has concentrated on technological 
progress. As shown in Pissarides (2000), innovation can be introduced into search and 
matching models in two ways. First, this can be done by assuming that technological progress 
is disembodied, meaning that labour productivity in both old and new jobs grows at the 
exogenous rate of technological progress. Second, on assuming Schumpeter’s notion of 
“creative destruction”, technological progress is embodied in new jobs, meaning that labour 
productivity in old jobs does not grow. 
As in the standard neoclassical model (Solow model), technological progress is 
disembodied in the sense that both old and new jobs benefit from higher labour productivity 
without it being necessary to replace their capital stock.2 In the disembodied technological 
progress, the higher the technological progress, the lower is the discount rate. Hence, the 
present-discounted profits are higher and firms open more vacancies. This is the so-called 
“capitalization effect”, which implies both higher growth and a lower steady-state 
unemployment rate (Pissarides, 2000). 
When technological progress is embodied in new jobs, growth can come about 
through job destruction and the creation of new and more productive jobs, owing to the need 
to replace the capital stock. In the case of embodied technological progress, the rate of job 
destruction is endogenous, and it is higher at faster rates of growth. Hence, faster 
technological progress is associated with a higher steady-state unemployment rate (Aghion 
and Howitt, 1994, 1998). 
According to Mortensen and Pissarides (1998), these opposite results found in the 
literature on growth and unemployment can be interpreted within a more general model in 
which the direction of the effect of productivity growth on unemployment depends only on 
the size of the updating cost. Formally, Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) find a critical 
renovation cost such that faster growth decreases unemployment if the updating cost is below 
                                                 
2
 This is the only form of technological progress that is consistent with a balanced-growth path. 
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this critical value, and it increases unemployment if the updating cost is above the critical 
cost. 
Finally, according to Mortensen (2005), there is no clear prediction about how the 
unemployment rate and the aggregate growth rate should be correlated across countries or 
across time, and the net effect of growth on unemployment is unclear. Indeed, in Mortensen’s 
model two opposite effects are at work: the negative effect of creative destruction on market 
tightness, since a more rapid rate of job destruction reduces the value of firm and entry, and 
the positive relationship between the creative destruction and labour market tightness implied 
by the steady-state equilibrium condition and the unemployment identity. 
The present paper takes another look at the structural link between growth and 
unemployment by recognising that the economy usually includes an underground sector, 
which is backward and less attractive for educated people with respect to the regular sector. 
The fact that education plays a key role in human capital formation and economic 
growth has been widely studied in the endogenous growth literature (Savvides and Stengos, 
2009) since the pioneering works by Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988). In particular, Laing et 
al. (1995) use a matching framework to analyze the ‘long-run’ endogenous growth rate in an 
economy in which ‘short-run’ labour market frictions and investment in education are 
important for the economic growth process. In particular, the economic growth rate depends 
crucially on the human capital growth rate. They find that a higher contact rate of workers 
with vacancies leads to a higher rate of growth of human capital and a lower level of 
unemployment. 
However, no study has attempted to link the human capital-economic growth nexus to 
unemployment through the economy’s sectoral composition. 
 
2. MODEL WITH UNDERGROUND SECTOR AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
2.1 The matching framework 
The paper proposes a general model of equilibrium unemployment where individual 
wage bargaining prevails in the labour market (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 
2000). Numerous firms competitively produce a homogeneous product, but adopt different 
institutional and technological set-ups. They may be registered, and therefore pay a 
production tax and adopt a relatively advanced technology; or they may not be registered, and 
therefore evade taxes and adopt a less efficient technology. Hence non-registered firms form 
the underground or shadow sector of the economy, which is illegal because of the process 
employed, not because of the good being produced. 
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As is usual in matching-type models (Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001), the meeting of vacant jobs and unemployed workers is regulated by an aggregate 
matching function ( )uvmm ii ,= , where { }sri ,∈
 
denotes the sector (r = regular, s = shadow), 
iv  measures the vacancies in the sector, and u  measures the unemployed (who are the only 
job-seekers). By assumption, the matching function is non-negative, increasing and concave 
in both arguments and performs constant returns to scale, so that the job-finding rate, 
( ) ( ) ( )1 ,/, iii muuvmg θθ == , is positive, increasing and concave in the so-called market 
tightness, uvii /=θ . Analogously, the rate at which vacancies are filled, 
( ) ( ) ( )1
 ,1/, −== iiii mvuvmf θθ , is a positive, decreasing and convex function in iθ . Further, the 
Inada-type conditions hold: ( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ ii gf ii θθ θθ limlim 0 ; 
( ) ( ) 0limlim 0 == →∞→ ii gf ii θθ θθ .3 
The Bellman equations specified to find infinite horizon steady-state solutions are:4 
Value of … Underground sector Regular sector 
a vacancy ( ) [ ]sssss VJfcVr −⋅+−=⋅ θ  ( ) [ ]rrrrr VJfcVr −⋅+−=⋅ θ  
a filled job ( ) [ ]ssssss JVwyxrJ −⋅++−= ρδ  [ ]rrrrrr JVwyxrJ −+−−= δτ  
searching for a job ( ) [ ]ssss UWgzUr −⋅+=⋅ θ  ( ) [ ]rrrr UWgzUr −⋅+=⋅ θ  
being employed ( ) [ ]ssss WUwWr −⋅++=⋅ ρδ  [ ]rrrr WUwWr −⋅+=⋅ δ  
 
where Vi is the value of a vacancy; Ji is the value of a filled job; Ui is the value for seeking a 
job;5 Wi is the value for being employed; r is the instantaneous discount rate; ci is the start-up 
cost; z
 
is the opportunity cost of employment; xi is entrepreneurial ability; yi is labour 
productivity; wi is the wage rate; τ is an exogenous production tax; ρ is the monitoring rate, 
i.e. the exogenous instantaneous probability of a firm being discovered (and destroyed) as 
unregistered; δ is the exogenous destruction rate. The parameters r, ci, z, τ, ρ and δ are always 
considered as positive and exogenous. 
Empirical evidence suggests that underground employment is one of low productivity 
jobs (Agénor and Aizenman, 1999; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Cimoli, Primi and 
                                                 
3
 The matching functions of the two sectors may be different, but evidence is lacking in this regard. 
4
 Time is continuous, and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely, and discount the future. 
5
 The unemployed cannot search for jobs in both sectors at the same time (i.e. there is a directed search). 
However, irrespective of the sector, if an unemployed person fails to find a job, s/he falls back into the same 
pool of unemployment. 
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Pugno, 2006; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2009). Therefore, our first key assumption is the 
following. 
Assumption 1. Labour productivity is lower in the underground sector with respect to 
the regular sector: rs yy < .
6
  
As usual, wages are assumed to be the outcome of a Nash bargaining problem: 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( )iiiiiiiii VJUWVJUWw −⋅−=−⇒−⋅−= − ββββ 1maxarg 1  with { }sri ,∈  
where the parameter ( )1 ,0∈β  is the surplus share for labour. Simple manipulations thus 
yield: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )rrrrrrr rVyxrUw θτβθβ −−⋅+⋅−= 1  
( ) ( ) ( )( )sssssss rVyxrUw θβθβ −⋅+⋅−= 1  
with ( ) 0' >iiw θ  i ∀ , since ( ) 0' <iiV θ , and ( ) 0' >iiU θ  i ∀ . 
The surplus of a job in each sector (divided between one entrepreneur and one worker 
by the wage) is defined as the sum of the worker’s and firm’s value of being on the job, net of 
the respective outside options, so that iiiii UWVJS −+−= . Using the Bellman equations, 
we get: 
( ) ( ) ( )ss
sss
s gfr
czyxS
θβθβρδ ⋅+⋅−+++
+−⋅
=
1
; ( ) ( ) ( )rr
rrr
r gfr
czyxS
θβθβδ
τ
⋅+⋅−++
+−−⋅
=
1
. 
Note that both the surplus and wages are heterogeneous within the two sectors, besides 
being different between them. This is due to the overall heterogeneity of entrepreneurial 
ability.  
The expected present values of vacancies for firms can be also obtained, since 
( ) ( ) sss SVJ ⋅−=− β1  and ( ) ( ) rrr SVJ ⋅−=− β1 , i.e.: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )ss
sssss
s gfr
grczyxf
xrV
θβθβρδ
θβρδβθ
⋅+⋅−+++
⋅+++⋅−−⋅⋅−⋅
=
1
1
                   [1] 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
rr
rrrrr
r gfr
grczyxf
xrV
θβθβδ
θβδτβθ
⋅+⋅−++
⋅++⋅−−−⋅⋅−⋅
=
1
1
                    [2] 
As in Fonseca et al. (2001), we ignore the range beyond which iθ  is large enough to 
turn irV  negative. Hence, it must be that ∈iθ [0, iθ
~ ) i ∀ , where ∞<iθ
~
 is the value such that 
( ) 0~ =iiV θ . Furthermore, since for 0=iθ  the vacancy would be always filled, the relevant 
interval for iθ  becomes ∈iθ (0, iθ
~ ) i ∀ , which implies 0≠u , 0≠iv  i ∀ . 
                                                 
6
 We neglect possibilities of moonlighting, so that workers can perform only one activity at a time. 
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2.2 Entrepreneurial ability and the underground sector 
A key feature of the model is that the comparison between the expected profitability of 
posting vacancies in the two sectors depends on the entrepreneurial ability of individuals ( x ). 
More precisely, let us assume the following. 
Assumption 2. Entrepreneurial ability x  is distributed over a unitary set of a 
continuum of infinitely-living individuals who expect to participate in production activity 
either as entrepreneurs or as workers. This ability can be measured in continuous manner, 
∈  x ] ,0[ maxx , following the known c.d.f. F : [ ]max  ,0 x [ ]1 ,0→ . 
The individual must be endowed with a minimum level of entrepreneurial ability in 
order to open a vacancy, thus becoming an entrepreneur. As will shortly be made clear, this 
minimum level is required to enter the underground sector only, because the level of ability 
required to enter the regular sector is even higher. The minimum ability required to become 
an entrepreneur, labelled with minx , can thus be obtained from the zero-profit condition in the 
underground sector, i.e. from 0=sV  in equation [1]:7 
( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) 0
1lim min0 >=⇒





⋅+++
−⋅⋅−
=→
sss
sss
s
s
y
z
x
gr
zyx
f
c
sv θβρδ
β
θ
 
Therefore, the zero-profit condition can be used to distinguish entrepreneurs from workers. 
Lemma 1. All the individuals endowed with 
minxx > , i.e. within the interval 
F(
maxx )−F( minx ), expect to profitably open a vacancy, thus becoming entrepreneurs, while the 
individuals, labelled with ( )minxFl ≡  and endowed with x ≤ minx , will not post any vacancy, 
thus becoming workers. 
Note that entrepreneurs will earn extra-profit as a rent in posting vacancies, because 
ability is not tradeable. 
Let us now define a threshold level of entrepreneurial ability ∈  T ],] maxmin xx  such that 
two entrepreneurs drawn from the two sectors yield equal expected profitability, i.e.: 
( ) ( )TxVTxV sr ===                                               [3] 
T  can therefore be derived from equations [1], [2], and [3]: 
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )11
11
+−+
+⋅+−+⋅++
=
AyBy
ABczBAczT
sr
srτ
                                                                               [4] 
with ( )( ) ( )r
r
f
grA
θβ
θβδ
⋅−
⋅++
≡
1
 and ( )( ) ( )s
s
f
gr
B
θβ
θβρδ
⋅−
⋅+++
≡
1
. 
                                                 
7
 In a framework in which the number of firms is fixed, the zero-profit condition is no longer used to determine 
the labour-market tightness (see Fonseca et al., 2001, and Pissarides, 2002). 
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Equation [4] defines T as a special x, so that the condition 0min >> xx  requires that 
T>0. Sufficient conditions for T>0 are that both the numerator and the denominator of [4] are 
positive. The numerator is positive if ( ) scz >+τ , zcr > , and sr cc > , which are realistic 
conditions8. The denominator is positive if ry  is sufficiently greater than sy , which is a 
necessary condition for the regular sector to be able to survive, and it qualifies our 
Assumption 1. 
A further result can be obtained from these restrictions: the intercept of ( )xVr  is lower 
than the intercept of ( )xVs , and the slope of ( )xVr  is steeper than the slope of ( )xVs  (see Fig. 
3). 
========== Fig. 3 about here (now at the end) ========== 
From the macroeconomic point of view, the entrepreneurs’ indifference condition [3] 
implies that, given the set of entrepreneurs l−1 , the share of entrepreneurs who open a 
vacancy in the regular sector is: 
( ) rvTF =−1                                      [5] 
while the share 
( ) svlTF =−                [6] 
opens a vacancy in the underground sector. Entrepreneurs may thus post a vacancy and then 
fill the job, or fail to fill it, in one of the two sectors, so that it can be simply stated that 
( )lvv sr +−= 1 .9 Hence, equation [4] can be re-written in a more general form as follows: 
( )svTT =
                  
[7] 
Equation [7] makes evident the relationship between the two variables sv  and T, and it can 
thus be called T-curve. Only the variable sv  appears in [7] because in this subsection the 
variable u appearing in [4] is taken as exogenous, thus underlining the fact that it is taken by 
entrepreneurs as given, while in the next section u will be a function of sv . 
The relationship is negative in the equation [7] because of the wage cost effect, and the 
effect due to search or congestion externalities (see Pissarides, 2000). In fact, if the irregular 
vacancies increase, wages increase, and the probability of filling them is lower. Hence, it is 
more difficult to fill an irregular vacancy and fewer entrepreneurs enter the irregular sector. It 
                                                 
8
 The value of the start-up cost in the underground sector cs should be very low, since ease of entry is often one 
of the criteria used to define the informal sector (Gërxhani, 2004). By contrast, the start-up cost cr is often very 
heavy because of regulations, administrative burdens, licence fees, bribery (Bouev, 2005). 
9
 In this model, the number of incumbent entrepreneurs, who run nr + ns firms, is exogenous, and adds to those 
who enter the market. Matters thus become simpler without loss of generality. 
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can thus be proved that 0/ <∂∂ svT  under restrictions very similar to those required for 
( )svTT = >0 (see Appendix A). 
Equation [7] can be coupled with equation [6], which represents the distribution of 
ability across entrepreneurs. In this equation sv  is monotonically rising in T from minx  up to 
maxx . Both equations [6] and [7] can thus be depicted in the diagram with axes [ sv ,T ], as in 
Fig. 4. Equation [7] has been built under the following condition: 
( ) ( )
( ) min0 1
1lim x
Ayy
AzAczT
sr
r
vs
>
+−
+⋅−⋅++
=→
τ  
so that the available entrepreneurial ability is sufficient to open some vacancies. 
Lemma 2. A unique intersection between the two curves exists, thus determining the 
partial equilibrium of the model, since u is taken as given. 
========== Fig. 4 about here (now at the end) ========== 
From this result, and from the previous one represented in Fig. 3, a further result 
follows, thus substantiating the statement that the minimum level of entrepreneurial ability to 
profitably open a new vacancy, i.e. minx , strictly regards the underground sector. 
Lemma 3. The less able entrepreneurs open irregular vacancies; the abler 
entrepreneurs open regular vacancies. 
 
2.3 Unemployment and the steady state general equilibrium 
Although the economy has two sectors, we empirically observe a single rate of 
unemployment, which is defined thus: 
sr nnlu −−=                                                                                                                            [8] 
where 
rn  and sn  represent steady-state employment in the regular and underground sector, 
respectively. Since jobs arrive to unemployed workers at the rate ( )ig θ , with { }sri ,∈ , and 
regular and irregular filled jobs are destroyed at the rate δ  and ( )ρδ + , respectively, then in 
the steady-state equilibrium it must be that: 
( )rr gun θδ ⋅=⋅
                                    
[9] 
( ) ( )ss gun θρδ ⋅=⋅+
           
[10]
  
Given the assumptions in the previous subsection, we can view ( )rgu θ⋅
 
and ( )sgu θ⋅
 
as the share of skilled and unskilled workers who find jobs, respectively. Steady-state 
unemployment is thus given by equations [8], [9] and [10]: 
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( ) ( ) 1+
+
+
=
ρδ
θ
δ
θ sr gg
l
u                                                           
                                       
   
[11] 
 This equation can be rewritten in general and explicit form as follows: 
u = u(vs)                                                                             
                                       
   
[12] 
where steady-state unemployment u is a function of vacancies in the underground sector only, 
since ( ) uvl sr /1 −−=θ  and uvss /=θ . Equation [12] can be depicted as a U-shaped curve in 
the (vs, u)-axes over the range )[1(,0] lvs −∈ , with perfect symmetry in the case of ρ=0 (see 
Appendix A). 
 Equation [12] closes the general equilibrium model formed by the system including 
the three main equations [4], [6] and [12] in the three unknowns vs, T, and u. It is intuitive that 
the equilibrium result obtained in the previous subsection (where u was taken as given), 
which concerned with the intersection between the curves represented in [6] and [7], does not 
qualitatively change if u changes through equation [12] only moderately. It can be proved that 
this condition is 
ss
s
r v
vu
θθ
1)(1
<
∂
∂
<− , which obviously holds for intermediate levels of vs (see 
Appendix A).  
It can also be proved that the equilibrium result does not qualitatively change even in 
the complementary conditions, i.e. 
rs
s
v
vu
θ
1)(
−<
∂
∂
 and 
ss
s
v
vu
θ
1)(
>
∂
∂
, which may hold when vs 
takes extreme values. In these two cases the macroeconomic condition of the labour market 
affects both the regular and the underground sector. In fact, for vs close to zero, ss vvu ∂∂ )(  
may be so negative that both θs and θr rise, but θs rises more than θr, while for vs close to 
(1−l), 
ss vvu ∂∂ )(  may be so positive that both θs and θr diminish, but θs diminishes less than 
θr (see Appendix A). 
Therefore, this concluding proposition can be obtained. 
Proposition 1. The solutions for the four key variables sv , rv , T  and u  are obtained 
by considering: 1) the present discounted values of the vacancies, i.e. equations [1] and [2]; 
2) the entrepreneurs’ indifference condition between open vacancies in the two sectors, given 
their entrepreneurial ability distribution, and the threshold level of entrepreneurial ability, 
i.e. equations [3] and [4]; 3) the unemployment identity [8] and the equilibrium condition of 
the transition flows on the supply side of the labour market, i.e. equations [9] and [10]. 
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2.4 Discussion 
The main result of the model of this section is that not only is there an interior solution 
whereby both the underground sector and the regular sector survive in equilibrium (Boeri and 
Garibaldi, 2006; Albrecht et. al., 2009), but this equilibrium is determined by allocating 
heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability between the two sectors (Rauch, 1991; Carillo and 
Pugno, 2004). This may explain the so-called “shadow puzzle”, i.e. the persistence of the 
underground sector despite advances in detection technologies and greater organisation by 
public authorities to reduce irregularities (issue (i) in the Introduction). This kind of 
explanation runs counter to the argument that the underground sector is an incubator of infant 
industries (see also La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Rauch, 1991; Levenson and Maloney, 1998). 
A number of other important results can be drawn from comparative statics exercises, 
although described in dynamic terms for shortness. A general exercise concerns the effects of 
the shift of the T-curve due to changes in some parameters. Its downward shift decreases both 
the (partial) equilibrium of sv  in Fig. 4, and the model’s (general) equilibrium of sv , and 
hence also sθ . Therefore, this downward shift squeezes the proportion of the underground 
sector and expands the proportion of the regular sector, as clearly emerges from equations [5] 
and [6], and as can be easily derived from equations [8], [9] and [10] jointly.  
The downward shift of the T-curve can thus increase overall output, because it 
increases the proportion of the most productive sector. The regular sector is in fact more 
productive than the underground sector for two reasons: the regular sector exhibits a greater 
labour productivity, and the most able entrepreneurs prefer this sector. In fact, for a greater 
number of regular vacancies made possible by the shift of the abler entrepreneurs from the 
underground sector, both the number of regular matches, ( )uvmm rr ,= , and skilled 
employment, rn , are greater because of the greater probability to find a regular job. 
The downward shift of T-curve also increases the shadow wage gap, i.e. the wage 
differentials between the two sectors. This effect is due to the rise of the equilibrium level of 
rv , since the wages are increasing functions with respect to the vacancies level. 
 The main policy implications can be drawn from the effects of the changes in the 
policy parameters on T, and hence on the proportion of the underground sector, i.e.: 
0<
∂
∂
ρ
T
; 0>
∂
∂
τ
T
; 0>
∂
∂
rc
T
. 
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In words, closer monitoring, lower taxation and lower start-up costs reduce the underground 
sector. This is in line with the conclusions of other models (see e.g. Friedman et al., 2000; 
Johnson et al., 2000; Sarte, 2000; Bouev, 2005). 
 A new contribution of this model regards a much more controversial question, i.e. the 
ambiguous relationship between the underground economy and unemployment (issue (ii) in 
the Introduction). This relationship is represented by the equation [12], which is U-shaped, 
thus showing that 
ss vvu ∂∂ )( <0 when vs is relatively small, and ss vvu ∂∂ )( >0 when vs is 
relatively great. But if ρ increases, then the minimum of u=u(vs) shifts in the region where vs 
is closer to zero. A more precise Proposition can thus be stated: 
Proposition 2. If vs ≤vr, the relationship between vs and u is negative if ρ is sufficiently 
low, it is positive if ρ is sufficiently high. If vs>vr the relationship between vs and u is positive 
for any ρ (see Appendix B for proof). 
 This is an interesting result from the policy implications point of view. In fact, the role 
of the monitoring parameter is strengthened, since any policy intended to reduce the irregular 
sector may also reduce the unemployment rate if ρ is sufficiently high.10 
 
3. EXTENSIONS TO INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
3.1 A steady-growth solution of the model 
This paper assumes that human capital accumulation is the primary engine of 
economic growth. In the growth literature, workers’ human capital usually refers to “the 
average level of educational attainment” (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel, 
1994) or similarly to “the average total years of schooling” (Savvides and Stengos, 2009).11 
Specifically, education and schooling enable workers to absorb knowledge and acquire 
additional human capital once employed (Rosen, 1976; Stokey, 1991; Laing et al., 1995). 
Therefore, it can be stated that the higher the level of schooling or knowledge (k) and the 
larger the human capital accumulation (h), the higher is the rate of economic growth.  
To simplify matters, and without loss of generality, we assume h = k, so that education 
and human capital will be used interchangeably. Then, let us specify a simple equation for the 
rate of productivity growth (γ ): 
                                                 
10
 Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2009) focus on the role of the job destruction rate. According to their matching 
model, policies that reduce the cost of formality (or those that increase the cost of informality) produce an 
increase in the share of formal employment while also reducing unemployment because the reallocation between 
formal and informal jobs has non-neutral effects on the unemployment rate, since informal jobs record much 
higher separation rates. 
11
 Indeed, the latter is often used as a quantitative proxy in empirical estimations (Savvides and Stengos, 2009). 
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( )hγγ =                  with ( ) 0' >hγ , ( ) 0'' <hγ                                                                        [12] 
with the further property that ( )hr γ>  h ∀ , in order to keep present values finite. 
Since the education level and skill in the workers employed in the regular sector are 
higher than those in the underground sector (Albrecht et. al., 2009; Cappariello and Zizza, 
2009), growth is expected to be faster in the regular sector. This link is assumed in the form of 
labour-augmenting technological progress à la Pissarides (2000),12 where, specifically, 
workers’ human capital plays two roles, as suggested by Laing et al. (1995). In fact, since 
human capital is firstly acquired through formal education, workers can be employed with an 
initial productivity ( 0y ) that depends on the level of schooling (h). Secondly, workers’ 
productivity increases according to equation [12]. Let us then state the following assumption. 
Assumption 3. The total discounted value of productivity in the regular sector is given 
by: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )hr
hydtehyehy thtrr γ
γ
−
⇒⋅⋅= ∫
∞
⋅⋅− 0
0
0                                                                               [13] 
where: 
0y = 0y (h)                    with 0y ’(h) > 0, 0lim 00 =→ yh , ∞<∞→ 0lim yh                                [14] 
Productivity in the underground sector is given by: 
( )hyy rs ⋅= ϕ   with 10 << ϕ           [15] 
According to this assumption, the underground sector partially benefits from this 
process because of spill-over effects in the diffusion of knowledge. Therefore, both sectors 
can grow at the same rate ( )hγ , while the level of productivity in the regular sector remains 
higher than that of productivity in the underground sector. 
In order to endogenise the rate of productivity growth, let us consider the optimal 
choice of education for individuals, given that schooling investment is costly (cf. Laing et al., 
1995; Decreuse and Granier, 2007), and that only regular firms profitably employ educated 
workers. Formally: 
Assumption 4. Let the cost function of education be c(k), with ( ) 0' >kc , ( ) 0'' >kc  
and ( ) 0/0 =∂∂ kc , because of either a direct pecuniary cost or the disutility from scholastic 
                                                 
12
 In our terms, Pissarides’s (2000) simple specification is: ( ) ( ) thr eythy ⋅⋅= γ0 , . 
 17 
effort. Each job-seeker in the regular sector solves the following program, before entering the 
labour market: 13 
( ){ }kcUmax r0k −≥     
( )
( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )




−⋅
+
+
+
⇒
≥
kckwW
gr
g
gr
z
max rr
r
r
r
k θ
θ
θ0
 
since ( ) [ ] ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )kwWgr
g
gr
zUUWgzrU
rr
r
r
r
rrrrr
⋅
+
+
+
=⇒−⋅+=
θ
θ
θ
θ , and wage depends 
on both labour market tightness and productivity. 
The job-seeker’s investment in education that maximises the value of his/her future 
search (k*) can be obtained by the usual condition: 
( )
( )
( ) ( ) 0=
∂
∂
−
∂
∂
⋅
+ k
kc
k
kw
gr
g r
r
r **
θ
θ
          [16] 
 This condition shows a positive relationship between rθ  and k, besides the implication 
that k* > 0. In fact, a rise in rθ  increases the probability of finding a regular job, i.e. ( )rg θ , 
and consequently both the regular matches and regular wages increase. Hence, in order to 
search for a job (work) in the regular sector, more workers choose to invest in education. In 
turn, the higher the optimal investment in education, the greater is human capital and the 
greater is the productivity level of the economy. Therefore, regular wages are higher also for 
the increase in the productivity level, while the increase in the size of the regular sector, i.e. 
rθ , spurs economic growth by a higher investment in education. 
It follows that, from a macroeconomic point of view, the investment in education is on 
the one hand negatively linked to the size of the underground sector, and on the other, 
positively linked to productivity growth of the economy through Assumption 3 and the 
equation h = k. The following Proposition can thus be stated. 
Proposition 3. The solution of the steady-state model can be extended to include the 
optimal investment in education (k*), and the rate of productivity growth of the economy (γ), 
thus finding a steady-growth solution. 
 These results, together with Proposition 2 of the previous section regarding the 
relationship between the underground economy and unemployment, help understand the 
relationship between economic growth and unemployment (issue (iii) in the Introduction). 
                                                 
13
 Workers invest in education when young, and having completed their schooling, they search for employment 
(Laing et al., 1995). 
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Indeed, the relationship between ( )hγ  and u is positive if ρ is low, this relationship is 
negative if ρ is high, under the condition that vs ≤vr. 
Our analysis is thus able to reconcile the conflicting results found in the literature on 
growth and unemployment. This suggestion is alternative to Aghion and Howitt’s approach, 
nevertheless it refers to the structure of the economy. Since the condition vs ≤vr is the usual 
condition throughout the world, the monitoring rate becomes a very important parameter. Not 
only does it affect the size of the underground sector, but it may positively affect both 
unemployment and economic growth. 
 
3.2 The case of multiple equilibria 
The extended model may also be adapted in order to account for a relevant case: that 
of regional dualism, i.e. the failure of the more backward region to catch up with the more 
developed region. 
Let us assume that ( )hy0  is a logistic function, i.e. it performs increasing returns to 
human capital before the usual and eventual decreasing returns. This form may be due to 
thresholds in human capital, i.e. once human capital attains a certain threshold level (critical 
mass) productivity may reach a higher steady-state level (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990). This 
pattern has also received some empirical evidence (Savvides and Stengos, 2009).14 
Under this assumption, the relationship between T  and sv  may change significantly. 
Indeed, if the functions [13] and [15] are plugged into [4], then multiple equilibria become 
possible since the T–curve may display an increasing part in the middle, thus cutting the other 
curve twice, as depicted in Fig. 4 (dotted line).15 
The two extreme equilibria may be labelled as “good” and “bad” because they define 
two different conditions where the proportion of the underground sector is small and, 
respectively, large, with the consequent desirable and undesirable characterisations. 
Specifically, in the “good” equilibrium one region exhibits higher productivity, a more 
efficient use of entrepreneurial ability, higher investment in education, greater employment of 
                                                 
14
 The models which describe general nonlinearities in the relationship between growth and human capital do not 
provide specific functional forms (Savvides and Stengos, 2009). Azariadis and Drazen (1990) even study a step 
functional form, where thresholds are more than one. 
15
 As shown by Savvides and Stengos (2009) – adapted from Azariadis and Drazen (1990) – a step functional 
form may generate the possibility of multiple equilibria, with different balanced growth paths. This growth 
process comes to an end when “labour productivity attains the highest possible value and the system settles 
down on the ultimate stage of growth” (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990, p. 517). 
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skilled workers, and, finally, a higher rate of economic growth with respect to the region in 
the “bad” equilibrium.  
This result is interesting because it can represent an economy characterised by a 
uniform institutional set-up, as captured by the same parameters of the model, but with two 
regions that differ in their histories, as captured by the initial economic structure. The region 
that has inherited a greater proportion of the underground sector may converge towards the 
“bad” equilibrium. The region that has inherited a smaller proportion of the underground 
sector may converge towards the “good” equilibrium. However, the region in the “bad” 
equilibrium does not catch up with the other region, because it exhibits a lower steady-
growth. This case seems to be the best fit with the Italian North-South divide, which is special 
but not unique in the world. This case is also interesting theoretically, because it shows the 
crucial importance of the allocation of entrepreneurship for economic development. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
Several empirical studies clearly document that the underground sector persists with a 
different size in many and various countries around the world, thus raising the ‘shadow 
puzzle’. Related studies also show that a less clear pattern emerges in the relationship 
between the size of the underground sector and unemployment. Another unclear pattern has 
been observed in the literature on economic growth, i.e. the pattern regarding the relationship 
between growth and unemployment. However, microeconomic studies have found that 
underground firms employ relatively backward technology, less skilled and less educated 
workers, as well as less able entrepreneurs, i.e. lower quality inputs for growth. This 
microeconomic evidence has suggested useful links to build up a matching type of model that 
is able to account for both the ‘shadow puzzle’, and the two evidenced unclear patterns. 
The assumption that entrepreneurial ability is a heterogeneous input for production is 
rather new in matching models. However, it can increase their explanatory power, because 
heterogeneous entrepreneurs can well-match to workers with different skills, thus forming 
firms with rather different productivity. In this way, less productive firms can persistently 
survive by evading taxes, and can discourage human capital accumulation and hence 
productivity growth. 
Monitoring firms’ regularity appears to be the key parameter for determining whether 
or not unemployment is complementary with underground employment, and, consequently, 
whether unemployment is positively or negatively correlated with economic growth. As 
shown in Figures 1 and 2, low levels of monitoring appear to make unemployment positively 
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correlated with economic growth, and high levels of monitoring appear to make 
unemployment negatively correlated with economic growth. 
The paper has also been able to account for the special case of regional dualism, as in 
the Italian case, where the more backward South diverges from the North, although both 
regions share the same institutional set-up. This case may arise if non-linearities in the human 
capital accumulation function produce multiple equilibria in the size of the underground 
sector. 
Finally, a number of policy implications follow from this analysis. Reducing the tax 
burden becomes especially effective if monitoring is at a high level, because underground 
firms are discouraged without raising unemployment. In the long run, this may also enhance 
growth. These same results follow if monitoring is itself increased. In the case of regional 
dualism, a one-shot change in the policy parameters may trigger an endogenous dynamic of 
convergence between the two regions. More generally, an effective policy should seek to 
increase entrepreneurial ability, typically through education, so that overall economic 
performance improves, both because of the sectoral composition effect, and because of the 
positive level effect of each firm.  
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Proof that 0<∂∂ svT  
 It will be firstly proved that 0<∂∂ svT  (with 0<vs<(1−l) and vr=1−l−vs) when u is 
assumed as exogenous, as in subsection 2.2, and then when u is assumed as endogenous, as in 
subsection 2.3.  
Sufficient conditions for 0<∂∂ svT  are that 0<∂∂ svN  and 0>∂∂ svD , where N and 
D are the numerator and the denominator of T in [4], both divided by (A+1)(B+1). To prove 
this, let us observe, from the definitions of A and B in [4], that 0<∂∂ svA  and 0>∂∂ svB , 
because 0>∂∂
r
A θ , 0<∂∂ sr vθ , and 0>∂∂ sB θ , 0>∂∂ ss vθ . Therefore, svN ∂∂  is 
negative if ( )zcr +> τ  and zcs > , as it emerges from the derivative of N: 
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while 
svD ∂∂  is always positive, as it emerges from the derivative of D: 
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The restriction set of the parameters for both T>0 and 0<∂∂ svT  thus becomes: 
( ) zczc sr >>+> τ , and yr sufficiently greater than ys. 
Subsection 2.3 assumes that u is endogenous through equation [12]. This equation is 
U-shaped within the relevant range of vs. In fact, the derivative of u(vs) can thus be calculated 
through some manipulations (more mathematical details are available on request from the 
authors): 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1''
''
+−+
+
−
+
+
−
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δ
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gggg
gg
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                                                                  [A.3] 
While the denominator of [A.3] is always positive because g(θi) is a concave function so that 
( ) ( )iii gg θθθ > , the numerator is negative for relatively small vs, and it is positive for 
relatively great vs, because, again, g(θi) is a concave function. 
 The fact that u(vs) is U-shaped maintains that 0<∂∂ svN  and 0>∂∂ svD , so that 
0<∂∂ svT . This can be proved by distinguishing the intermediate range of vs around the 
minimum of u(vs), from the extreme ranges, where vs is either close to zero or close to (1−l). 
In the former case, ( ) ss vvu ∂∂  is relatively small, so that it can satisfy these conditions: 
ss
s
r v
vu
θθ
1)(1
<
∂
∂
<− , which guarantee that 0<∂∂ sr vθ  and 0>∂∂ ss vθ , and thus also that 
0<∂∂ svA  and 0>∂∂ svB , because 
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vuv )(11)( θ . This case also holds for the extreme ranges of vs, if g(θi) is not 
very concave. 
 In the lower range of vs, where it is close to zero, the condition 
s
s
r v
vu
∂
∂
>−
)(1
θ
 emerges, 
if g(θi) is very concave, as in the Cobb-Douglas specification of the matching equation. In this 
case, the derivatives 
sr v∂∂θ  and svA ∂∂ take the “perverse” positive sign, while ss v∂∂θ  and 
svB ∂∂  maintain the positive sign, although increasing in size both because the numerator of 
θs rises, and because its denominator diminishes. The limit of [A.1] makes it evident that 
svN ∂∂ <0: 
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lim , which would be equal to ∞−  if the matching function 
were Cobb-Douglas. Similar reasoning can be applied to D, which would be equal to ∞  at the 
limit of the Cobb-Douglas case. 
 In the upper range of vs, where it is close to (1−l), , the condition 
ss
s
v
vu
θ
1)(
>
∂
∂
 emerges, 
if g(θi) is very concave. In this case, the derivatives ss v∂∂θ  and svB ∂∂  take the “perverse” 
negative sign, while the derivatives 
sr v∂∂θ  and svA ∂∂ maintain the negative sign, although 
becoming even more negative, both because the numerator of θs diminishes, and because its 
denominator rises. The limit of [A.1] makes it evident that, again, 
svN ∂∂ <0: 
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, which would be equal to ∞−  if the matching function 
were Cobb-Douglas. Similar reasoning can be applied again to D, which would be equal to ∞  
at the limit of the Cobb-Douglas case. 
 
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2 
 Equation [12] is perfectly symmetric with respect to vs if ρ=0, so that u(vs) is at the 
minimum when vs=vr. If ρ>0, the minimum lies in the region where vs<vr. In fact, the 
condition for the minimum ( ) ss vvu ∂∂ =0 that can be derived from [A.1] is ( )( )r
s
g
g
θ
θ
δ
ρδ
'
'
=
+
. 
This condition states that the greater is ρ, the smaller is the level of vs for which u(vs) is at the 
minimum. Therefore, for any given vs such that ( ) ss vvu ∂∂ <0 at some level of ρ, there exists a 
sufficiently greater level of ρ such that ( ) ss vvu ∂∂ >0. Note that this result holds even if two 
different concave matching functions governed the two sectors, although the downward 
bound of the range of vs where ( ) ss vvu ∂∂ >0 for any ρ would be different from vs=vr. 
 Let us give a numerical example by using the Cobb-Douglas matching function, the 
parameters as given in the literature, such as the exponent of the function is equal to 0.5, 
δ=0.15, and let us assume that l=0.5, and that vs=0.15, which is the 30% of the vacancies open 
in the whole economy. It thus emerges that ( ) ss vvu ∂∂ <0 if ρ=0.04, and ( ) ss vvu ∂∂ >0 if 
ρ=0.08. Both values for ρ are close to those given by the literature (Boeri and Garibaldi, 
2006; Busato and Chiarini, 2004). 
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FIGURE 1. Unemployment vs Growth in EU countries (see Table 2 for the data details) 
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FIGURE 2. Unemployment vs Growth in Latin American countries (see Table 3 for the data details) 
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TABLE 1. Data for Figure 1 
 
EU non-transition 
countries 
unemployment rate      
(%) * 
GDP growth rate      
(%) * 
Rule of Law ** 
(Percentile Rank 
***) 
Austria 3.73 2.29 99.0 
Belgium 6.40 2.04 89.0 
Cyprus 3.63 3.77 84.2 
Denmark 3.88 1.56 99.5 
Finland 6.76 3.21 97.6 
France 7.44 1.90 90.0 
Germany 8.51 1.47 93.3 
Greece 7.98 3.98 73.2 
Ireland 3.74 5.02 94.3 
Italy 6.43 1.16 62.2 
Luxembourg 3.06 4.27 96.2 
Malta 4.69 1.80 91.4 
Netherlands 2.88 2.16 94.7 
Portugal 5.48 5.84 83.7 
Spain 8.43 2.80 85.2 
Sweden 4.92 4.71 98.1 
United Kingdom 3.71 1.70 92.3 
    
 
EU transition countries 
unemployment rate      
(%) * 
GDP growth rate      
(%) * 
Rule of Law ** 
(Percentile Rank 
***) 
Bulgaria 10.94 5.59 51.2 
Czech Republic 6.18 4.20 77.0 
Estonia 7.86 7.02 84.7 
Hungary 5.73 3.52 76.1 
Latvia 8.91 7.32 71.3 
Lithuania 9.47 6.97 67.5 
Poland 13.11 1.32 65.1 
Romania 5.46 5.70 53.6 
Slovakia 13.52 4.32 67.0 
Slovenia 4.92 3.31 82.3 
 
 
* (2000 - 2008) average. 
Source: (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes) 
** Source: (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_countries.asp) 
*** Percentile rank, from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). Precisely, according to the World Bank, the ‘Rule 
of Law’ index measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
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TABLE 2. Data for Figure 2 
 
Latin America 
countries 
Unemployment 
rate *  
GDP growth 
rate ** 
Rule of Law 
index *** 
Argentina 12.95 2.51 32.10 
Bolivia 5.2 1.47 12.00 
Brazil 8.99 2.08 46.40 
Chile 7.46 3.51 88.00 
Colombia 13.92 2.73 37.80 
Costa Rica 6.01 2.74 62.70 
Dominican Republic 14.7 3.85 33.00 
Ecuador 8.99 3.05 9.10 
El Salvador 6.75 1.06 30.60 
Guatemala 2.25 1.50 12.90 
Honduras 4.48 2.85 20.60 
Mexico 3.2 1.72 29.70 
Nicaragua 7.64 0.91 21.10 
Panama 11.85 3.45 49.80 
Paraguay 7.52 -0.20 15.30 
Peru 7.94 3.40 25.80 
Uruguay 12.77 1.58 65.60 
Venezuela, R. B. de 12.28 2.63 2.90 
 
* (%) of labour force (2000-2008) average. Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/  
** (2000 - 2007) average.                                                                                                                                                     
Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, 
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, August 2009.  
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php 
*** Source: (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_countries.asp).                                                                                                                          
Percentile rank, from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). 
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FIGURE 3. Entrepreneurs’ indifference condition 
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FIGURE 4. Interior equilibrium and multiple equilibria 
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